

Between Solidarity and Profit

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Between Solidarity and Profit
The Agricultural
Transformation Societies
in Spain (1940–2000)

CÁNDIDO ROMÁN CERVANTES

Centre for the Study of
CO-OPERATIVES



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Introduction

THIS PAPER IS AN INTRODUCTION to a wider project on the origins and importance of the *Sociedades Agrarias de Transformación* (Agricultural Transformation Societies — ATS) and their current role in the process of modernizing associative Spanish farming.¹ It is a model of social enterprise that falls between the solidarity form, with co-participation among members — akin to the co-operative structure — and firms that endeavour to maximize profit, a characteristic of any company operating in the market. In other words, the ATS strive to unite the advantages of capitalist societies with those of individual entrepreneurs. Agricultural Transformation Societies are, together with co-ops, the only non-mercantile formulas currently operating within the Spanish agricultural associative framework.

The challenges to agriculture posed by Spain's entry into the European Economic Community in 1982 forced a response from state authorities. This response centred on farming associationism (or mutualism), which led to the use of associative models that not only had roots in Spanish agriculture but had also been shown to be efficient incentives for agricultural development. Entities whose organizational structure could play that role already existed — the *Grupos Sindicales Colonización Agraria* (Agrarian Colonization Syndicates, or ACS). The transformation from the ACS model to the ATS model that began in 1982 is still underway in Spain. Those ACS that are unable to conform to the new associative format (i.e., the format embodied by the ATS) simply disappear, while others, the most active ones, adapt and incorporate the necessary changes.

The Origins

THE ORIGINS of the Agricultural Transformation Societies can be found in the Agrarian Colonization Syndicates of the 1940s; consequently, ATS are based on the principles of the agrarian policy of the post-war Franco period.² The international conflict, the scarcity of elementary inputs for agrarian production, the productive paralysis, and, above all, the severe food shortages at that time generated policies geared to rural development and, inevitably, led to an emphasis on formulas of co-operation among farmers, which, in turn, encouraged actions of mutual support. These activities were regulated by the *Ley de Colonización de Interés Local* (Law of Local Interest Colonization), passed on 25 November 1940. The law stipulated that the state must assist ACS that had been established to meet Spain's agricultural requirements; the law's purpose was to change Spanish agriculture from an individual to a group concept, which was understood as any form of common labouring (mutual help) among farmers, such as a farmer providing a certain number of hours of labour in exchange for the loan of another farmer's mechanized plow. The overall objective was for farmers to share scarce means of production, from the common use of a tractor or harvester to communal harvesting; in other words, specific functions that affected farmers as a group and covered the whole set of tasks involved in farming and livestock rearing were to be shared.

In addition to creating entities that minimized the problems associated with production and distribution, which were common during this period of economic despotism, the goal was to encourage more solidarity and more commitment, from a social point of view, to what was a profoundly individualistic rural setting. Farmers were to take part, not as individuals but as general members, in groups such as the

Hermandades Sindicales, the *Falange Española Tradicionalista*, and the *Juventudes Obreras Nacional Sindicalistas*. The Spanish state established the *Obra Sindical de Colonización* to oversee and assume responsibility for meeting this goal. From a normative point of view, the original purpose of these groups was to use public funds to make improvements in territorial and hydraulic infrastructure; thus, in principle, they were not agrarian associative entities. However, a set of legislative measures (*órdenes* and *circulares*) widened these syndicates' field of action by endowing them with elements of solidarity, co-operation, and commerce.³

Syndicates were also encouraged to act as intermediaries between farm labourers and the state. In this way, semi-public links between both parties were established, using a kind of consortium statute through which the state offered public financing and the syndicate groups worked to modernize the agrarian infrastructure. Obviously, the *agrupados* (groups/collectives) were the prime beneficiaries of this situation, as they were able to undertake work such as building roads and irrigation channels, establishing new farm units, etc. At the same time, however, they were seen as another instrument of control over Spanish agriculture, dictated by the regulatory doctrine of General Franco's regime.

Based on the data in Table 1 (overleaf), it is clear that irrigation was the state's priority. In the fifteen years between 1947 and 1962, the largest portion of state subsidies went to irrigation projects: from 49.59 percent of the total number of pesetas invested in the 1947–1952 period to 46.05 percent invested in the last five-year period under analysis. Other types of work experienced some growth, for instance, rural construction such as housing, storage spaces, and other buildings associated with rural development. After representing only 11.27 percent of subsidies from 1947 to 1952, syndicates involved in rural construction received 22.40 percent of subsidies from 1953 to 1957 and 21 percent from 1958 to 1962. A slight increase in the amount of

subsidies directed to electrification projects also occurred. In the years when the majority of the Spanish agrarian sector had little access to electricity, the construction of power stations that would supply electricity, not only to villages and peasant homes but also to the agro-food industries, became a high priority. It was far different in the case of subsidies for work done on family orchards, the water supply, and plantations, all of which declined, as did monies destined for social works.

Table 1: State subsidies to Agrarian Colonization Syndicates (ACS) for local colonization work, 1947–1962 (quinquennial averages in percentages)


Type of Work	1947–1952		1953–1957		1958–1962	
	#	Pesetas	#	Pesetas	#	Pesetas
Irrigation	44.62	49.59	38.86	46.49	47.17	46.05
Water supply	0.61	0.53	1.11	0.50	0.58	0.34
Family orchards	7.20	7.31	5.28	4.48	2.18	2.70
Rural buildings	8.96	11.27	27.06	22.40	23.10	21.00
Manure mounds	5.30	6.14	3.64	2.31	--	--
Tobacco dryers	0.80	2.78	1.37	2.27	--	--
Electrification	2.57	3.32	1.45	3.20	2.40	4.14
Rural industries	0.47	2.46	0.73	6.08	0.76	14.00
Plantations	10.55	4.88	8.75	4.94	4.91	3.37
Sanitation	17.56	10.11	11.61	6.99	16.81	8.04
Social works and improvements	1.33	1.55	0.09	0.28	0.04	0.31
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: *Anuarios del Instituto Nacional de Estadística*, 1947–1962. Compilation by the author.

The ACS were formed to drive the development of rural irrigation projects, buildings, and electrification and to promote rural industries.

The Spanish government and, therefore, the ACS executive organism, the *Obra Sindical de Colonización*, considered these syndicates to be the primary social vehicle for rural development and for the modernization of the Spanish agricultural sector.⁴

Graph 1



Source: *Anuarios del Instituto Nacional de Estadística*, 1947–1962. Compilation by the author.

From 1962 to 1972, the scheme did not undergo much change. *Obra Sindical de Colonización* data for 1971–1972 illustrate the amount of land cultivated by syndicate activity and the number of *agrupados* that benefited from state subsidies in several categories. The highest number of beneficiaries was found in the irrigation category (which involved 200,727 people), followed, at some distance, by community farm, cereal crop, cattle breeding, livestock, farming, machinery

acquisition, and orchard categories (a total of 93,705 people). Next came syndicates involved in electrification, rural roads, and sanitation (64,932 people), then those in charge of forest replanting (21,591), and, finally, agro-industry groups (19,883). In terms of the land surfaces affected by these types of work, irrigated areas were first, covering 496,856 hectares, followed by electrification, at 325,171 hectares, agro industries, at 191,418 hectares, and forest replanting, at 95,927 hectares.⁵

By 1963, the success of the ACS had begun to be noticed at the national level; 165 syndicates were being created each year and, by 1963, there were 3,645 of them. By 1970, however, their numbers had reached 14,438, an average of 1,200 per year.⁶ The reasons for this large increase had a great deal to do with an order passed by the Ministry for Agriculture on 25 June 1963. The order specified a range of state interventions that favoured growth and granted the ACS several advantages that were not extended to Spanish co-operatives. For instance, the ACS did not require a minimum of fifteen members to be legally constituted — three would do; in case of dissolution, their reserve funds, community works, and net account balances could be divided between their members; and, finally, the concept of “one person, one vote” that regulated the co-operatives did not apply to the ACS. Other rules applied, depending on the number of members and the available capital.⁷

Legislative modifications were produced to help agricultural groups adapt to the changes brought about by the new political situation. The *Real Decreto-Ley* 31/1977 (2 June) eliminated the requirement that the ACS be syndicated and outlined the procedures, adaptations, and fiscal system that applied to them; additionally, they would now be known as *Sociedades Agrarias de Transformación*, or Agricultural Transformation Societies, and were given full jurisdictional powers. Some four years later, on 3 August 1981, the *Real Decreto* 1,776/1981 approved the ATS statutes, which dictated the process that the

new societies had to follow and the deadlines they had to meet in order to conform to the law. Failure to do so would lead to their legal dissolution.

The ATS statutes were defined according to precedents found in the ACS statutes, although the ATS were given a more flexible structure. In part, these precedents served as a design for an agricultural organization that could both retain its social and mutual components and respond with greater flexibility to the goals of a much more competitive agricultural setting. In time, these new societies would take their rightful place within Spain's social economy, alongside the farming co-operatives, which represented the essence of solidarity, joint participation, and mutualism, and the representatives of private business, such as limited liability companies.

Agricultural Transformation Societies and Farming Co-operatives: How They Differ

IN SPAIN, co-operatives are supervised by the Department of Labour and Social Security, while ATS are overseen by the Department of Agriculture and Fishing. The current regulations that apply to each also differ. An ATS may legally function with as few as three members, while co-operatives must have a minimum of seven.⁸ Although principles such as “free admission,” “voluntary termination of partners,” or “open doors” do not apply to ATS, they are required for the creation of a co-operative. Furthermore, the co-op principle of “one person, one vote” does not apply to the economic agreements engaged in by ATS members, nor does the principle of “exclusivity”; that is, there is no limit to how many transactions

individuals may carry out with third parties, which, in effect, allows them to freely buy and sell their products. The societies are also legally exempt from maintaining Education and Community Works Reserve Funds, although they may choose to have them. Another difference can be observed in the legal constitution of each type of organization. In order to be a legal entity, a co-operative must have a public deed, while a society only requires a deed if it has offered real estate as capital. Finally, ATS are not required to register with the business registry office.

This comparison may lead to the conclusion that a social (co-operative) model exists in which members have neither decision-making authority nor a say in how the business is being run. In other words, mutualism, as an ideal set of common interests, is relegated to a secondary role and priority is given to more individualistic criteria, the sole objective of which is to increase profits. When compared to a public company, however, this is clearly not the case. Transformation societies are non-profit companies that acquire legal status by registering with the General Registry of the ATS, and the ATS General Assembly has full autonomy to approve the statutes that establish how the societies will be administered. In the case of public companies, the Business Registrar is responsible for ensuring that they comply with the relevant statutes. A public company is essentially capitalistic and impersonal: shareholders do not matter — only their capital contribution (either money or assets) does — and they can freely sell their shares. In contrast, ATS are essentially personal: the role of members in a society is just as important as their economic contribution, and the replacement of one member by another is more complicated since the new member must have similar characteristics to the former one and must be approved by the General Assembly. Finally, public companies have a limited amount of liability and their members need not be concerned about their personal wealth. Societies, however, must first make use of their capital investment in liability cases; secondarily, members are liable in a joint and unlimited way.

The 1940s state legislation that created and administered the ACS and the farming co-operatives and the more recent laws that regulated the change to the ATS model obligated the members of these entities to practise the internal operations of their organization in a mutual fashion. Today, organizations that supply agricultural and livestock products to non-members or allow non-members to sell the organization's products risk losing their state tax benefits. This is the only way for the state to guarantee the societal character, the mutualism, and the united interests that define these associative entities.

A Case Study: Agricultural Transformation Societies in the Canary Islands

THE ASSOCIATIONS IN THE CANARY ISLANDS adapted quickly to the new rules regulating Agricultural Transformation Societies (ATS). Although ATS have the same constitutional requirements as farming co-operatives, the Canary Island associations had to adjust to the specific objectives set out for these societies by the Royal Decree 1776/1981. The first of these objectives concerned economic activity, that is, the production, transformation, and commercialization of agricultural, livestock, and forestry products; the second involved the improvement of the rural environment and the promotion and development of land and agriculture. The decree ordered the Agrarian Colonization Syndicates either to enrol in the General Registry of the ATS — after modifying their structure as associative enterprises — or to dissolve. Consequently, some 22 percent of the groups operating in the province of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and 18 percent of those operating in Santa Cruz de Tenerife adopted the ATS statutes. Between 1981 and 2000, a total of

411 societies, with 8,540 members and a capitalization of 12,915,931 € were registered.

The composition of ATS in the Canary Islands from 1982 to 2000 is shown in Table 2. According to the data presented in this table, of all the societies, those geared to the production and commercialization of bananas and those whose main business is water management not only have the largest number of members, 51.35 percent and 23.90 percent, respectively, but also have the largest volume of capital, 28.83 percent and 12.15 percent, respectively. Moreover, the two activities employ 75.25 percent of all those employed by the ATS; the remaining employees work for societies that produce wine and grow flowers, vegetables, and tomatoes. Of the secondary societies, the most relevant in terms of share capital are those dedicated to the cultivation and commercialization of flowers (9.86 percent), to vegetables (9.33 percent), and to wine production (8.15 percent). Societies with a smaller portion of the total share capital include those dedicated to fruits (5.72 percent), livestock (5.18 percent), and fruits and vegetables (4.57 percent).

A more detailed study of those ATS involved in the production and commercialization of bananas and the management of water resources is necessary, given their importance. Of the eighty-one societies in the islands that produce and sell bananas, those with fewer than fifty members account for 74.07 percent of the total number; of those in that category, 56.79 percent are societies with fewer than ten members. In other words, among those societies that produce and sell bananas, there is a high number of small societies with few members but high capitalization; indeed, 70.96 percent of the investment in the banana sector is in these small societies. At the other extreme, those with more than fifty members represent only 25.91 percent of the total number of societies in the banana sector, and although they have the largest number of members, they have a relatively low degree of capitalization, just 29 percent. There are two main reasons for this sit-

uation: first, the statutes allow a minimum of three members to form a society; and second, because small producers (the majority) have smaller land areas and, consequently, a lower productive capacity, in order to survive they have to work together to sell their produce.

Table 2: Structure of ATS in the Canary Islands, according to productive activity, 1982–2000

Activity	Societies	%	Members	%	Capital (€)	%
Bananas	81	19.70	4,387	51.35	3,724,073	28.83
Vegetables	69	16.78	334	3.90	1,205,209	9.33
Tomatoes	50	12.16	202	2.36	371,858	2.87
Water	42	10.21	2,042	23.90	1,569,793	12.15
Livestock — cattle	34	8.27	157	1.83	669,813	5.18
Fruits	26	6.32	119	1.39	739,491	5.72
Flowers	23	5.59	143	1.67	1,274,538	9.86
Fruits & vegetables	21	5.10	104	1.21	590,522	4.57
Winery	17	4.13	480	5.61	1,052,701	8.15
Apiculture	7	1.70	76	0.88	41,356	0.32
Milk & dairy products ¹	2	0.48	153	1.79	175,435	1.35
Potatoes	2	0.48	8	0.09	6,912	0.05
Citrus fruits	2	0.48	7	0.08	4,207	0.03
Others ²	8	1.94	36	0.42	119,661	0.92
Total	411	100.00	8,543	100.00	12,915,931	100.00

Notes


1. CELGAN, in Tenerife, has a share capital of 162.273 € and 149 members.

2. Includes societies that deal in heliculture (snails), silk, aviculture, chemical products, seeds and fertilizers, tropical fruits, aromatic herbs, and construction.

Source: *Registro de Sociedades Agrarias de Transformación, Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación*. Compilation by the author.

Clearly, both in terms of capital invested and number of members, the ATS in the banana sector stand out.⁹ The societies whose main activity is managing aquifers in order to sell water have a very similar structure to those in the banana sector but are less polarized. Of the societies that manage water resources, 42.85 percent have fewer than ten members but hold 44.50 percent of the sector's total capital. Those societies that have between ten and one hundred members represent 42.85 percent of the sector, have 34.85 percent of its members, and possess 41.94 percent of its capital. Finally, those with more than one hundred members comprise 14.28 percent of the sector, have 60.57 percent of its members, and hold 13.54 percent of its capital. Geographically, Tenerife has 14.28 percent of the societies that manage water resources and 15.58 percent of the capitalization; La Palma has 14.28 percent of the societies and 4.22 percent of the capitalization; and the island of El Hierro has only a single society.

Graph 2: Development of ATS in the Canary Islands, 1983–1997



Source: *Registro de Sociedades Agrarias de Transformación, Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación*. Compilation by the author.

Table 3: Distribution of ATS according to number of members in 2000

Distribution of Members	ATS (A)	Members (B)	Capital (C)	(A) %	(B) %	(C) %
<= 10	329	1,459	8,652,335	80.04	17.07	67.38
10 to 50	42	1,029	1,866,885	10.21	12.04	14.53
50 to 100	17	1,142	1,077,438	4.13	13.36	8.31
100 to 500	22	4,291	1,318,509	5.35	50.22	10.23
>= 500	1	622	76,131	0.24	7.28	0.59
Total	411	8,543	12,840,564 €	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: *Registro de Sociedades Agrarias de Transformación, Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación*. Compilation by the author.

The figures in Table 3 confirm the sectoral data stated for ATS involved in banana growing and water management, that is, the bulk of the members is in the larger societies but the bulk of the capitalization is in the smaller societies. In effect, the micro company is a dominant feature of modern associationism in the Canary Islands. The concentration of capital invested in the smaller societies indicates that their objectives are similar to those of any enterprise: to add and to maximize value for their members. The democratic component of generating employment through member participation remains relegated to the background. In this situation, where there are a lot of smaller societies, it is very difficult to start one process toward the concentration in societies of larger proportions of capital. However, in terms of numbers of members, as Table 3 shows, the 17.07 percent of members who are part of societies with fewer than ten individuals have accumulated 67.38 percent of the capital invested in the ATS of the Canary Islands. At the other extreme, the 57.50 percent of members belonging to societies with more than one hundred individuals hold only 10.82 percent of the total capitalization. In general terms, these data indicate the high degree of polarization found within Canary Island associationism.

The distribution of the societies in the Canary archipelago is related to the amount of productive farming activity that takes place on each island. Gran Canaria and Tenerife, the two main islands, together have the most societies (81.49 percent), the largest proportion of the capitalization (81.36 percent), and the highest concentration of members (57.03 percent). Specifically, there are more societies and more members on Gran Canaria (14.87 percent more members) than on Tenerife, but Tenerife has a higher percentage of capitalization (50.84 percent) than Gran Canaria (30.52 percent). The island of La Palma is the next most important; its ATS members are involved in the banana sector. The very few societies found on the smaller islands specialize in agricultural and food products that are for local consumption, rather than for export.¹⁰

Table 4: Geographical distribution of Canary Island ATS, 2000

Island	ATS	%	Capital (€)	%	Members	%
Gran Canaria	193	46.95	3,941,987	30.52	1,801	21.08
Tenerife	142	34.54	7,212,804	50.84	3,072	35.95
La Palma	41	9.97	1,204,335	9.32	3,415	39.97
Fuerteventura	15	3.64	98,178	7.60	76	0.88
Lanzarote	3	0.72	189,319	1.46	17	0.19
La Gomera	5	1.21	2,313	0.01	17	0.19
El Hierro	6	1.45	143,048	1.10	105	1.22
Total	411	100.0	12,915,931	100.0	8,543	100.0

Source: *Registro de Sociedades Agrarias de Transformación, Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación*. Compilation by the author.

Conclusion

THIS PAPER IS AN INTRODUCTION to a wider research project that aims to demonstrate the vital role of Agricultural Transformation Societies in the modernization of Spain's social agrarian economy. It presents a brief overview of the structure and distribution of the *Grupos Sindicales Colonización Agraria*, or Agrarian Colonization Syndicates, given that the ATS were based on the associative elements of the ACS. The ATS, which have been operating for more than forty years, have been both leaders of and witnesses to the changes that have taken place in the Spanish agrarian sector. These changes have resulted in a move away from a traditional model of agriculture (with its significant infrastructure and equipment problems) to a more competitive model that is oriented to market demands for farming and cattle products.

Data relating to Spain's Canary Islands were used to demonstrate the vitality and dynamism of this mode of farming associationism. Despite the predominance of ATS in the banana sector, smaller initiatives in the areas of cattle rearing, agro-industrial enterprises, aviaries, milk and dairy products, and vineyards and wineries contributed to an overall stability and produced an indispensable portion of the islands' agricultural and food requirements. Some initiatives involved small and medium landowners joining together and investing their capital in the construction of infrastructure, such as irrigation channels, greenhouses, and water-storage facilities, in order to respond to the demands of the farming sector. Farming associationism in the Canary Islands has followed a process of consolidation that has included objectives such as maximizing returns and reducing unitary production costs, in addition to having a tendency to fuse smaller units into larger ones; the result has been a more dynamic and more

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versatile model of collective management that is market directed. This has allowed other societies to engage in productive activities that require higher investments in intensive capitalization, such as growing flowers, grapes for wine production, or fruits and vegetables.

Endnotes

1. According to data from the Department of Agriculture and Fishing and Food, there were 11,607 operative ATS, comprised of 316,345 farmers and with a capital investment of 553,757,520.16 €. *Hechos y cifras del sector agroalimentario y del medio rural español*, 2002, p. 87.
2. There is a significant amount of literature concerning ACS, especially from the 1960s, a critical period for traditional agriculture. At that time, several studies began to examine the viability of ACS as associations of farmers and their capacity to respond to the increased competition in farming. See M. Garro Quiroga, *Los grupos sindicales de colonización como instrumento de colonización agrarian* (Madrid: 1968); J. J. Álvarez-Sala Moris, *Nuevas formas de empresa agrícola: Grupos sindicales de colonización* (Madrid: 1964); M. García Brera, *Los grupos sindicales de colonización: Una fórmula española de agricultura en cooperación* (Madrid: 1971); J. Paniagua Gil and R. Carbonell de Masy, “Grupos sindicales de colonización,” *REVESO, Estudios Cooperativos*, 32 (1974): 19–32.
3. A law passed on 27 April 1946, and subsequent modifications of it, defined these groups as “juridical persons in private law, their associative nature of a particular interest, character and syndicated makeup by their constitution and relationship with the framework of a Syndical Organization, and personality and patrimony of their own, and distinct from that of their associates, with full capacity to enjoy and exercise their rights for the fulfillment of their purposes.”
4. Article 98 of the Regulations of the *Obra Sindical de Colonización*, passed on 20 March 1943, contemplated the possibility that the *Obra* could contribute capital to ACS. However, when it had been given more than 50 percent of its capital, the group had to convert into a capitalist society in which the majority of the capital predominates.
5. J. Paniagua Gil and R. Carbonell de Masy, “Grupos Sindicales,” p. 31.

• ENDNOTES

6. J. Paniagua Gil and R. Carbonell de Masy, "Grupos Sindicales," p. 24.
7. "The decisions will be taken by the majority, each partner having the right to one vote, whichever is the capital represented by him; in case of a tie, the vote of the president is decisive. However, if the General Assembly so considers, it may establish, when approving the Internal Regiment Rules, that, in order to adopt decisions on certain matters, which the Rules themselves contemplate, the majority of persons and capital is required." *Instrucción Circular nº 77 de la Obra Sindical de Colonización*.
8. According to the *Ley de Cooperativas Agrícolas del 16 de julio de 1999*.
9. Those with the highest number of members are based on La Palma: BONANA, with 622 members and capitalization of 17,400,000 pesetas; PALMADRID, 388 members and 7,900,000 pesetas; and CEJAS, 369 members and 1,886,000 pesetas. Tenerife has MAYCAR, with 321 members and 401,250 pesetas in capitalization, as well as LOS TRUJILLOS in Santiago del Teide, with 140 members and 2,159,000 pesetas. In Gran Canaria, LAS VEGAS DE ARUCAS has 147 members and capitalization of 3,220,000 pesetas, and LOS ROSALES GRANADOS has 112 members and 2,300,000 pesetas. The two most-capitalized societies in relation to their number of members are both in Tenerife, in the municipality of San Miguel: ALDEA BLANCA, with 5 members and 30,000,000 pesetas; and LA ESTRELLA, with 6 members and 90,000,000 pesetas.
10. Of the five registered ATS in La Gomera, four centre on the production of honey: APICULTURA SANA; GUYMISA; ROYAL PALM; and ALVAMAR. Two of the three ATS on Lanzarote concentrate on grape growing and wine production: BODEGAS VEGA DE YUCO and TABLERO DE LAS QUEMADAS. In El Hierro, the ATS are more diversified, alternating between cattle rearing (TEJELEITA); potatoes (PIE DE CABRA and EL MATORRAL DE FRONTERA), fruits and vegetables (VIRGEN DE LA CANDELARIA), and water management (HOYA DEL VERODAL). In comparative terms, the ATS of Lanzarote have the highest level of capitalization.

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